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Solutions must be reached for the problems of modem zoning, urban and
rural conservation.... [L]and planners are now only at the beginning of the
path to solution. In the process of traversing that path further, new ideas
and new standards of constitutional tolerance must and will evolve.
I. INTRODUCTION
Property law has evolved steadily throughout American jurisprudence.
Although the judiciary has played a role in initiating productive utilization of land
by ratifying the doctrine of adverse possession,2 land-use planning via zoning and
regulation suggests that the trend is turning toward preservation. To effect this
preservation of land and the vital resources it contains, the Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency has begun restricting land use in the Lake Tahoe region for the benefit of
this greater good.4 This swing in the pendulum from productive utilization toward
preservation has initiated many law suits that have combined to develop our takings
jurisprudence.5
Transferable Development Rights (TDRs) have the potential of playing a major
role in Fifth Amendment takings analysis.6 The United States Supreme Court,
1. Fred F. French Investing Co., Inc. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 381, 389 (N.Y. 1976).
2. See John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 U. C-r. L. REV. 519,
537-38 (1996) (discussing the manipulation by the nineteenth-century American courts of the English common law
doctrines in order to exalt productive utilizers of land over the idle owner). The doctrine of adverse possession was
transformed in the United States to promote the development of the wilderness. See id. at 539 n. 113.
3. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,138 (1978) (holding a New York historical
landmark preservation law, which forbade the construction of a high-rise over the existing Penn Central Station,
did not constitute a taking as per the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution); Hadacheck v. Sebastian,
239 U.S. 394,409-10 (1915) (finding that the police power was properly used when advancing the common good
of the community); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887) (noting that the police power was appropriately
used to forward and preserve the common good of the community).
4. See CAL. GoV'T CODE § 66801 (West Supp. 1998) (regulating the development of land in Lake Tahoe
region in order to preserve the scenic beauty, natural resources and social and economic health in the area).
5. The sheer number of takings cases evidences the import placed on this single clause of our Constitution.
See U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken, for public use, without just compensation."). For
an overview of the Supreme Court's evolving treatment of takings cases, see generally Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987), Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. De Benedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987), Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982), Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981), Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), Goldblart
v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962), Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962), Kimball Laundry Co. v.
United States, 338 U.S. I (1949),Hurlyv. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95 (1932), Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926), Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), Muglerv. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
6. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 137 (dictum) (stating that TDRs could be applied to the analysis under the
Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, but that the case at hand did not require such analysis). But see Suitum v.
Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659, 1670-73 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing in his concurring
opinion on the issue of ripeness, Justice Scalia posits in dictum that the relevance of TDRs should be "limited to
the compensation side of the takings analysis").
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however, has never ruled on the issue of using TDRs as a tool in determining
whether a taking has occurred.7 A possible explanation for the Court not reaching
this issue may be the inequitable results certain to occur if such an analysis were
employed. 8 One glaring inequity is the possibility of sham TDR schemes
completely destroying the protections guaranteed by the Fifth AmendmentY
TDRs are a valuable resource if used properly. 0 One commentator explains that
"[t]he cornerstone of a successful TDR program is public confidence in the value
of TDR credits."'" Moreover, the implementation of a TDR scheme may only be
feasible in "very specific conditions."'" As such, determination of whether a TDR
scheme is feasible should be made before any further analysis is undertaken because
the viability of a TDR presents a threshold issue that must be decided before its
application of the TDR to a Fifth Amendment takings analysis. 3 This Comment
concludes that the determination will have to be made on a case by case basis
because assuming the TDR scheme is feasible, it should only be relevant to the
issue of whether just compensation has been paid in the event a taking has
occurred.'
4
Part II of this Comment briefly discusses current takings law in order to
establish a foundation from which to determine where TDRs fit. 5 Part III of this
Comment explores the historical development and uses of TDRs.' 6 Moreover, Part
mjuxtaposes traditional uses of TDRs with the more contemporary uses articulated
7. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 137 (dictum) (suggesting that the presence of TDRs may effect a takings
analysis); see also supra note 6 (citing the competing dicta between Penn Central and Suitum).
8. See infra note 206 and accompanying text (discussing potential implementation of sham TDR schemes
to circumvent inverse condemnation claims); see also Steven R. Levine, Environmental Interest Groups and Land
Regulation: Avoiding the Clutches ofLucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1179,1209-10
(1994) (arguing that regulatory boards should implement TDRs as a means to circumvent regulatory takings claims).
9. See infra Part IV (noting the effects and potential abuses of using TDRs in Fifth Amendment takings
analysis); see also Levine, supra note 8, at 1209-10 (encouraging land-use planners to implement TDR schemes
to circumvent a Lucas categorical takings claim).
10. See, e.g., Joseph D. Stinson, Comment, Transferring Development Rights: Purpose, Problems, and
Prospects in New York, 17 PAcE L. REV. 319, 345-55 (1996) (analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of TDRs as
well as suggesting criteria for implementing successful TDR programs).
11. See id. at 346-47 (explicating that public confidence in a TDR scheme is necessary for that scheme to
be successful).
12. See id. (noting that TDR schemes require certain variables to be in place in order for the scheme to be
effective).
13. See infra Part IV (discussing the importance of determining a TDR's value before reaching the issue
of what role it plays in the Fifth Amendment takings analysis). Logic also dictates that a TDR's value must be
assessed prior to making a determination of whether it mitigates the economic burden of the regulation or provides
partial or total just compensation.
14. See infra Part IV.A.2 (suggesting that the logical solution is merely to look to the TDR for just
compensation purposes rather than postulating the TDR value to determine if a taking has occurred).
15. See infra Part H (outlining the current state of takings law in order to establish a basis from which to
analyze what role TDRs should play in the Fifth Amendment's takings analysis).
16. See infra Part IILB (exploring the historical development of TDRs).
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in recent case law.17 Part IV focuses on the Constitutional issues surrounding
TDRs.18 Specifically, Part V examines the role of TDRs in Fifth Amendment
takings t9 and just compensation' ° analyses. Given the fact that no court has directly
considered the issue, Part IV of this Comment suggests the proper use of TDRs in
a Fifth Amendment analysis.2' Part V concludes that TDRs should only be
considered when determining if just compensation has been paid.' If courts follow
the dictum of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, which suggests
that TDRs can be considered in a takings analysis,23 courts will effectively "read-
out" the just compensation requirement expressed in the Constitution. 24
II. CURRENT TAKINGS LAW
The "Takings Clause" of the United States Constitution states, in pertinent part,
"nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." ' 5
From this clause arose an area of the law that has many facets, as evidenced by the
continuing exploration and evaluation of the current status of takings law.26 Over
the decades, the United States Supreme Court has wrestled with the takings issue
and has espoused principles, some easier in application than others, in hopes of
guiding lower courts through the abyss created by the Takings Clause.27
17. See infra Part II.C.I (comparing the historical use of TDRs with contemporary application of TDRs,
including the modem trend for land-use planners to use TDRs as part of a regulatory scheme in order to mitigate
burdens placed on regulated landowners in environmentally sensitive areas in the context of the Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency's plan).
18. See infra Part IV (explaining the constitutional trade-offs of applying TDRs to the Fifth Amendment
takings analysis vis-a-vis just compensation).
19. U.S. CONsT. amend. V (stating in pertinent part, "nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation").
20. Id.
21. See infra Part IV.A.2 (suggesting that TDRs only be considered on the just compensation side of the
Fifth Amendment analysis in order to promote equity, public confidence, and effective TDR schemes in general).
22. See infra Part V (concluding that in order to evolve with modem land use planning, TDRs must be
considered as compensation rather than value for Fifth Amendment purposes).
23. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978) (dictum) (stating that TDRs
may be considered in determining the extent of the economic impact of the regulation in an ad hoc takings analysis).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. V (requiring the payment of just compensation in the event private property has
been taken for public use).
25. Id.
26. The sheer number of articles concerning the law of takings signals the interest and import placed upon
it by comnentators and practitioners alike. See Richard J. Lazarus, Litigating Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency in the United States Supreme Court, 12 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 179, 180 n.l (1997) (listing more than
fifty articles concerning the issue of takings written in 1996 and early 1997, demonstrating both the interest and
uncertainty that this area of the law brings). The author's assertion is strengthened given that no major takings
decision was handed down by the Supreme Court in either of these years. Id.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 3 1-37 (discussing the current status of the law of takings by looking
at both the historical development and recent decisions of the Supreme Court); see also infra text accompanying
notes 38-64 (covering current takings law).
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The simplest form of a taking is the exercise of eminent domain. Eminent
domain is the power of the government to force real property transfers to itself.2
These forced sales of real property result in the payment of just compensation to the
landowner.29 Accordingly, a takings claim is not initiated in these situations because
the landowner is paid just compensation in satisfaction of the Fifth Amendment
requirement. 0
In 1922, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon t changed the general notion that the
Takings Clause only protected private landowners against direct appropriations.32
Penn Coal, well known for Justice Holmes' oft cited "too far" test,33 was the first
in a line of Supreme Court decisions that set out to limit regulatory power exercised
by the government and various states.3' However, as noted by Justice Scalia, Penn
Coal offered little guidance as to the application of the "too far" test.35 The Court
wrestled with this "too far" dilemma in the years following Penn Coal. As a result,
takings jurisprudence gradually evolved over the years. Consequently, subsequent
case law developed two categories in modern takings law: the ad hoc factual
inquiry3 6 and categorically per se takings.
37
28. See JULItUSL. SACKMAN &RUSSELLD. VANBRUNTNICHoLS ONEMINENTDOMAIN §§ 1.1-1.3 (3d ed.
rev. 1992) (noting that eminent domain is in the nature of a forced transfer of real property to the government for
fair market value).
29. An interesting issue arises in this area as well. Query as to what constitutes just compensation for the
landowner forced to sell her land. Should just compensation be based on the value of the land to the individual
landowner? Or should it depend solely on the fair market value of the land? See Clynn S. Lunney, Jr.,
Compensation for Taidngs: How Much is Just?, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 721, 722-23 (1993) (arguing that the Court's
interpretation of just compensation is about as solid as its determination of when a taking has been effected).
30. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that property can be taken for public use as long asjust compensation
is paid). Eminent domain is essentially the government purchasing property for public use with or without the
consent of the landowner. See SACKMAN & VAN BRUNT, supra note 28, §§ 1.1-1.3 (noting that eminent domain is
a form of purchase).
31. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
32. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992) (acknowledging the evolution
of the Takings Clause while citing Penn Coal as the case which recognized that a regulation in and of itself may
effect a taking of private property).
33. See Penn Coal, 260 U.S. at 415 (stating that, "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking"). Penn Coal gave birth to the oft cited maxim, "too far."
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014.
34. See Penn Coal, 260 U.S. at 414-15 (recognizing that in order to maintain meaningful protection against
physical appropriations of private property, the government's power to redefine the range of interests included in
the ownership of property was necessarily subject to constitutional constraint).
35. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014 (noting that "[Penn Coal] offered little insight into when, and under what
circumstances, a given regulation would be seen as going 'too far' for purposes of the Fifth Amendment").
36. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,123-24 (1978) (eschewing any set formula
for determining how far is too far and placing a preference on an ad hoc factual inquiry to determine whether a
regulatory scheme amounts to a taking).
37. As will be discussed in more detail below, there are two instances when a regulatory action is
compensable without case-specific inquiry. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
441 (1982) (holding that a New York law requiring landlords to allow a cable company to place cables on an
apartment building constituted taking, even though physical invasion was only minor); infra notes 50-64 and
accompanying text (discussing the two instances where the Supreme Court has given categorical treatment to a
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A. Ad Hoc Approach: Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City
The ad hoc approach forwarded in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City38 was an attempt to confront and remedy the "too far" dilemma.3 9 This
fact sensitive approach incorporates a balancing of factors to determine if a
regulatory taking occurs. In Penn Central, the Supreme Court confronted the "too
far" dilemma by incorporating three factors in determining a taking.4° First, a court
must determine the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant.4' Economic
impact in this context refers to the amount of money the landowner loses or falls to
realize in light of the regulation.42 Furthermore, diminution in property value,
standing alone, cannot establish a regulatory taking.43 Second, a court shall assess
whether the regulation interferes with the "distinct investment-backed expectations"
of the landowner." When making this assessment, a court considers those
expectations of the individual landowner present at the time the land was acquired.
Finally, a court should review the character of the governmental action.
46
In Penn Central, the majority held that the investment-backed expectations of
landowners were not abridged to the extent that a taking had occurred because Penn
Central Station was profitable in its existing state.41 Moreover, the character of the
governmental action-preservation of city landmarks-advanced a legitimate
regulation affecting a landowner); see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 (holding that an owner of real property who
is required "to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his
property economically idle[,] ... has suffered a taking").
38. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
39. See infra notes 40-49 and accompanying text (setting forth the ad hoc approach and the considerations
used in determining if a regulation goes "too far").
40. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (explicating that the three relevant factors are the economic impact of
the regulation on the claimant, the extent to which the regulation interferes with the claimant's investment-backed
expectations, and the character of the governmental action).
41. Id
42. Id
43. See id at 131 (rejecting the notion that diminution in property value alone constitutes a taking); see also
Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384,396-97 (1926) (noting that 75% diminution in value caused by a
city ordinance validly executed under the state's police power was not sufficient in and of itself to constitute a
regulatory taking); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394,405 (1915) (noting that 87% diminution in value alone
did not constitute a taking).
44. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 134-35 (noting that the owners of Grand Central Station actually derived some benefit out of
having the station determined a landmark and that designation as a landmark contemplates that the landowner use
the land as originally intended). For an interesting Article on the concept of average reciprocity of advantage, see
Raymond R. Coletta, Reciprocity of Advantage and Regulatory Takings: Toward A New Theory of Takings
Jurisprudence, 40 A,. U. L. REV. 297 (1990) (postulating that landowners burdened by regulatory schemes are
benefitted by them as well given the increase in the value of the surrounding land resulting from the regulatory
scheme as a whole).
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public interest.4s The ad hoc balancing approach espoused in Penn Central follows
the view that no one factor is dispositive. More importantly, at least for the purposes
of this Comment, the Court alluded to the presence of TDRs and their potential
relevance to the ad hoc analysis. 9
B. Categorically Per Se Takings
In two specific situations courts will find a regulatory taking requiring just
compensation without inquiring into the public interest advanced by the
regulation.50 The first instance concerns a regulation requiring a permanent physical
invasion of the land." In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,52 the
Supreme Court reasoned that the right to exclude is the most essential right a
property owner has within his or her bundle of rights5 3 Moreover, this right must
not be taken from the landowner without just compensation no matter how
important the public interest in the regulation.' The import placed upon this right
is evidenced by the Court's willingness to invalidate regulations causing minor
encroachments.55
The second recognized that a per se taking occurs when a regulation denies all
economically beneficial or productive use of the land.- Cognizant of the fact that
48. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 132 (noting that New York's landmark preservation law required singling
out individual parcel owners which was not arbitrary; rather, it "embodie[d] a comprehensive plan to preserve
structures of historic or aesthetic interest wherever they might be found in the city").
49. See infra Part IV.B (suggesting that the dicta posited by the Penn Central Court is either limited to its
specific facts or that it was not fully considered at the time it was proposed).
50. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (describing two categories
of regulatory takings that don't require "case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced" because they
encroach upon the landowner's right to exclude or productively utilize his land).
51. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982) (holding that a
permanent physical occupation of land constituted a per se taking no matter how small the invasion nor the
importance of public interest involved).
52. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
53. See id. at 433 (observing that a landowner's right to exclude is the most important stick in the bundle
of rights).
54. See id. at 436 (noting that "the permanent physical occupation of the property forever denies the owner
any power to control the use of the property; he not only cannot exclude others, but can make no non-possessory
use of the property").
55. See id. at 436-37 (explicating that even minor physical invasions, such as a small cable running the
length of a building, constitute a per se taking because the owner's right to exclude is a paramount right).
56. See generally Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (noting that when a regulation deprives a landowner of all
economically beneficial or productive use of his or her land, he or she has suffered a categorical taking); Nollan
v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) (noting that requiring an uncompensated conveyance of
an easement to the government is violative of the Fourteenth Amendment); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
De Benedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 499 (1987) (stating that the coal required to remain in the ground, when viewed as
a "reasonable unit," does not come close to proving that land has been deprived of all economically viable use);
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 295-96 (1981) (holding that the
Surface Mining Act easily survives the denial of all economically beneficial use test); Agins v. City of Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255,260 (1980) (espousing the principle that a regulatory taking occurs either when the regulation or the
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this rule was never followed by a justification, Justice Scalia noted in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council57 that the total deprivation of a beneficial use, at
least from the landowner's perspective, was in fact equal to a physical occupation.58
In Lucas, the petitioner purchased two residential coastal lots in 1986 for the
purpose of erecting two single family homes. 9 These plans were halted two years
later when the South Carolina Legislature passed the Beach Front Management
Act.6" This Act directed the South Carolina Coastal Council "to establish a
'baseline' connecting the landward-most 'point[s] of erosion.., during the past
forty years."'' 61 The baseline's location is significant because land falling seaward
of it is "flatly prohibited" from construction of "occupiable improvements. 62 This
baseline was fixed landward of petitioner's parcels, thus prohibiting the
development of the residential units on either.63 The Court held that South Carolina
had effected a taking by requiring petitioner to sacrifice all economically beneficial
use of his land for the common good.6
The real question is whether land can ever be denied of all economically
beneficial or productive use? This question is riddled with complexities given the
fact that all real property retains some value.65 Because of this uncertainty, several
questions must still be addressed: Where do TDRs fit into this quagmire? Would or
should the outcome in Lucas be different if the regulation that prevented the
landowner from building on his property included several TDRs worth $5000 a
piece?66 Does the existence of these TDRs foreclose a per se takings claim?67
Should TDRs be included in the investment-backed expectations factor in the Penn
ordinance does not substantially further a legitimate state interest, or it denies an owner of all economically viable
use of his or her land).
57. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
58. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017 (positing this possible justification for the per se approach as suggested by
Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
59. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006-07.
60. See id at 1007 (noting that this regulation "had the direct effect of barring petitioner from erecting any
permanent habitable structures on his two parcels").
61. Id at 1008 (citing S.C. CoDE ANN. § 48-39-280(A)(2) (Law Co-Op. Supp. 1990)).
62. Id at 1008-09.
63. Ua.
64. See id at 1019 (elucidating the notion that requiring an owner to leave his land economically idle is
tantamount to sacrificing all economic beneficial use and as a result the owner has suffered a taking).
65. At least in a hypothetical sense, a landowner is hard pressed to prove that there is absolutely no
economically beneficial or productive use. See id. at 1016-17 n.7 (discussing the difficulty surrounding the denial
of all economically beneficial use test). Hypothetically, Mr. Lucas could have sold his parcels to neighbors
interested in creating a buffer zone around their lot. However, the Court did not entertain this mode of argument.
Id.
66. See infra Part IV (examining the differences, if any, when an arbitrary amount is awarded to a TDR
scheme).
67. See infra Part IV (suggesting that a TDR's presence should not foreclose a takings claim).
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Central ad hoc approach? Or alternatively, for the sake of not further complicating
an already complex legal doctrine, should TDRs be considered as a component of
just compensation in the event a taking is found?69 Part IV of this Comment seeks
to answer these questions and offers a solution to the ultimate question: What do we
do with TDRs in the Fifth Amendment Takings analysis?70 However, in order to
reach a conclusion, a general understanding of the TDR and its uses is helpful?1
m. TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS
A. What is a TDR?
TDRs are a relatively new phenomena. 2 The TDR, based on the well-accepted
bundle of rights theory, is the transfer of a property owner's development right to
another lot.73 One of those rights within the bundle is the right to develop. The
premise of TDRs is that the right to develop is a severable right and may be
transferred to another lot or person.74 The purpose of TDRs is to reduce "the
regulatory disparity among otherwise similarly situated properties. 75 Proponents
of TDRs contend that this disparity is curtailed because the landowner's burden is
ameliorated by receiving value for the development right transferred.76
The paradigmatic example is in the area of historical landmark preservation.'
In essence, TDRs allow the owner of restricted land to transfer the land's unused
zoning potential to other owners of property in the area.78 Generally, the owner of
68. See infra Part IV.A (offering, as an alternative, the introduction of TDRs into the investment-backed
expectation approach of Penn Central).
69. See infra Part iv.B (presenting the proposed solution of this Comment).
70. See infra Part IV (considering the above-mentioned solutions).
71. See infra Part IlI (analyzing the inception and evolution of the TDR to lay a foundation for discussing
the role that TDRs should play in the Fifth Amendment Takings Analysis).
72. See Dennis J. McEleney, Using Transferable Development Rights to Preserve Vanishing Landscapes
and Landmarks, 83 ILL. B.J. 634, 635 n.9 (1995) (observing that TDRs began receiving serious consideration by
commentators in the early Seventies).
73. See RICHARDJ.RODDEWIG&CHERYLA.INGHRAM,TRANsFERABLEDEVELOPMENTRIGHTSPROGRAMS:
TDRs AND TH REAL EsTATE MARKETPLAcE 2 (1987) (noting the concept of a property owner holding a "bundle
of rights," one such right being the right to develop his or her property).
74. Id.
75. Norman Marcus, Transferable Development Rights: A Current Appraisal, PROB. & PROP., Mar.-Apr.
1987, at 40.
76. See Thomas E. Roberts, Takings, Due Process, and Preemption, 29 URB. LAW. 399, 399 (1997)
(suggesting that TDRs can ameliorate the burden to a regulated landowner).
77. See Stinson, supra note 10, at 330 (noting that certain buildings in the same historical landmark zoning
district were subject to restrictions that others were not); see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 136 (1978) (recognizing that TDRs may be a viable mechanism for reducing the disparity of treatment
via regulation of historical landmarks).
78. Marcus, supra note 75, at 40-41; see JESsE DUKEMIIER & JAMES E. KIER, PROPERTY 1213 (3d ed.
1993) (explaining:
[T]he TDR approach severs development rights from other rights in land and treats them as a separate
item. The right to develop is restricted at particular sites or in so-called restriction areas. But owners
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the unused potential can do one of two things; he or she can either sell this unused
potential to a third party or retain this potential for further development on other
parcels owned within the municipality.79 TDRs separate an owner's right to possess
land from the owner's right to develop that land. ° In theory, this appears to be a
wonderful solution for landowners whose land has fallen victim to regulation.
However, this Comment points to several issues that must be resolved in order to
institute a viable TDR plan.8
B. Specific Uses of TDRs
TDRs were developed as regulatory tools intended to further the purposes of
land-use planning by mitigating the burdens placed on regulated landowners.8 2 One
commentator has noted that TDRs evolved due to changing priorities, and that three
concerns are primarily responsible for their development.8 3 Of these three concerns,
historical landmarks and metropolitan congestion were the traditional purposes for
which TDRs were created84
of the restricted land are given TDRs that can be used for development, beyond that which would be
otherwise permitted, on receiving lots or in so-called transfer areas.).
79. TDR schemes vary; see, for example, Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 108-14, which reviewed the New York
TDR scheme that allowed the transfer of the development rights to nearby or adjacent parcels of either third parties
or to lots owned by the party being regulated if such lots were available. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66801 (West
Supp. 1998) (allowing for the sale of TDRs to willing third party purchasers approved by the Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency).
80. See John J. Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75, 85-86
(1973) (describing that
[d]evelopment rights transfer breaks the linkage between particular land and its development potential
by permitting the transfer of that potential, or "development rights," to land where greater density will
not be objectionable. In freeing the bottled-up development rights for use elsewhere, the technique
avoids the either/or dilemma because it both protects the threatened resource and enables the owner of
the restricted site to recoup the economic value represented by the site's frozen potential.) (footnote
omitted).
81. See infra note 206 and accompanying text (discussing the potential for implementing "sham" TDR
schemes to create appearance that burdened owner retains some "economic value" of his or her restricted land);
infra note 208 and accompanying text (recognizing the potential for abuses of TDRs through the implementation
of sham schemes); see also Levine, note 8, at 1209-10 (suggesting that TDRs be used by regulatory agencies to
circumvent Lucas and its progeny).
82. See Stinson, supra note 10, at 324 (postulating that these regulatory tools were intended to further the
purposes of land-use planning); see also Roberts, supra note 76, at 399 (explaining that TDRs are used to mitigate
the loss of value to individual landowners caused by regulatory programs that place sharp restrictions on the use
of land).
83. See Stinson, supra note 10, at 327-28 (proposing that three concerns give rise to the implementation of
TDR schemes). These concerns are: (I) historical landmarks do not fully utilize the density allocation permitted
by zoning where competing interests to preserve those landmarks exist; (2) congestion in metropolitan and suburban
areas has created a demand for open space; and (3) economic incentives to develop in ecologically sensitive areas
are subject to competing interests to preserve natural resources. Id
84. See id (explicating that preservation of historical landmarks and emergence of metropolitan congestion
gave rise to TDRs as a land use tool).
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TDR schemes vary from size of receiving lots to percent limits on transferable
rights, but several factors determine a strong TDR scheme. First, a TDR should be
marketable because the value of that TDR is important to the burdened landowner.8 5
A prevalent factor to consider when determining the marketability of a TDR is
whether there is competition for those development rights. 6 As a counterpart to
competition, allowance for a sufficient receiving area is another prevalent factor
that leads to a successful TDR scheme.87 Competition and sufficient receiving areas
increase the value of TDRs to the burdened landowner and strengthen the TDR
scheme.88 A TDR scheme that creates marketable TDRs is less susceptible to attack
and is more likely to pacify the landowners of the burdened property.
Second, a TDR scheme is strong when it is efficient.8 9 Consequently, the
presence of excessive red tape prevents the implementation of a sound TDR
scheme.' Finally, a strong TDR scheme is embraced by the public.91 Public
knowledge and confidence in the scheme fosters the goals of offsetting the burden
to the landowner while preserving land that the public deems necessary.
Furthermore, public knowledge is an added protection against a "sham" scheme
being implemented to avoid takings claims.' These factors combine to determine
the marketability of a given TDR. In order for the TDR to have a place in the
constitutional analysis it must first be marketable. Therefore, the need for
marketable TDRs creates a threshold issue which must be considered prior to any
analysis concerning takings and just compensation.
Given the need to preserve space and protect historical landmarks, it is not
surprising that the earliest uses of TDR schemes occurred in large metropolitan
cities such as New York and Chicago.93 A brief description of these two schemes
is a helpful tool to introduce TDRs in their traditional context because each scheme
85. See id. at 347 (noting the importance of the value of TDR to its ultimate marketability).
86. See id. (noting the importance of competition to a successful TDR scheme).
87. See id. at 347 (explaining that the major fault of most transferable development rights systems is the
provision of an insufficient area to which the TDRs may be transferred). The receiving area is the land within the
municipality which is available for development rights transfer. Generally, the receiving area is determined at the
time the TDR scheme is implemented. One can see how the availability of receiving lots and competition for the
TDRs interrelate and, in fact, are dependent upon one another.
88. See id. (stating that these factors increase the marketability of TDRs and, in turn, increase the value that
the burdened owner receives for the TDR he or she holds).
89. See id, (noting that the more marketable a TDR is the less likely the burdened landowner will feel
aggrieved).
90. See id at 334 (noting that excessive red tape would discourage the transfer of development rights even
with the "proper mix of supply and demand").
91. Id.
92. See infra Part IV (discussing possible abuses of TDR schemes in the event the Supreme Court holds that
TDRs may be considered as value for purposes of regulatory takings claim); see also Levine, supra note 8, at 1209-
10 (suggesting that TDRs be used by land regulators to circumvent the Lucas type categorical takings claims).
93. See generally Ellen M. Randle, The National Reserve System and Transferable Development Rights:
Is The New Jersey Pinelands Plan An Unconstitutional "Taking"?, 10 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 183,203-05 (1982)
(noting the limited application of the TDR concept to historical landmarks in metropolitan cities such as New York,
Chicago, Washington D.C., and San Francisco prior to the late seventies).
1998 /Role of TDRs in Takings Analysis
was developed when TDRs were relatively new.' Moreover, each plan has subtle
differences which are useful in illustrating the ability of TDRs to be molded to
surrounding circumstances in order to enhance their usefulness.95
1. The New York Plan
The New York City Landmark ordinance was enacted in order to preserve well-
known city landmarks.6 It prevented buildings designated as landmarks from being
destroyed or altered.97 One commentator has noted that this regulation resulted in
"substantial underdevelopment of the location sites. 98 However, this ordinance
allowed the unused development potential of sites occupied by landmark structures
to be sold and transferred to adjacent and nearby properties.9 As a result, the
receiving lot's floor area could, subject to a"wide array of controls,"''t be increased
by more than twenty percent over the zoning ceilings already in effect."t1 The
rationale of the TDR scheme was that--even though the burdened property owner
lost the ability to develop further or destroy. the landmark affected by the
regulation-the owner retained some value by the sale of his or her development
rights.10
2
The Landmarks Preservation Law'03 led to the perennial United States Supreme
Court takings case, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.t°4 In Penn
Central, the Court applied a three factor test'05 ultimately holding that New York's
Landmark Preservation Law had not effected a regulatory taking by restricting plans
for a fifty-five story high-rise expansion over Grand Central Terminal.' 6 This pro-
94. See infra Part 1II.B.1-2 (discussing the New York and Chicago plans in order to illustrate various TDR
schemes).
95. See infra Part ll1.B.1-2 (noting the differences between the New York and Chicago plans); see also Infra
Part II.B.2 (highlighting the differences between the New York and Chicago plans).
96. Landmarks Preservation Law, NEWYoRKCITY, N.Y. CHARTER AND ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A, §§ 205-1.0-
207-21.0 (1976).
97. Id.
98. See Stinson, supra note 10, at 204 (noting that the regulated sites were left substantially
underdeveloped).
99. See id. (discussing the limitations of the transfer of development rights in the New York scheme to
nearby or adjacent parcels).




103. Landmarks Preservation Law, NEWYORKCrrY, N.Y. CHARTERANDADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A, §§ 205-1.0-
207-21.0 (1976).
104. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 38-46 (enumerating the three factor approach espoused in Penn
Central).
106. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 136-37 (utilizing the three factor test in ultimately holding that the
regulation preventing the expansion plans did not constitute a taking). The Court's analysis hinged on the time that
the owner's distinct investment-backed expectation was determined. Id. The inference drawn from the Court's
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preservation standard, espoused by the majority of the Court, was an important
stepping stone in takings jurisprudence because it demonstrated the Court's
continued willingness to sacrifice a landowner's right to build for that of the general
welfare-historical landmark preservation."°  Moreover, in dictum, the Court
suggested that TDRs should be figured into the effect of the regulation when
determining if a taking had occurred." This dictum leads to the gravamen of this
Comment. Specifically, should TDRs be used in determining whether a taking has
occurred or should it simply be a question of whether TDRs mitigate or fulfill the
just compensation requirement of the Fifth Amendment? t°9 In an effort to preserve
historical landmarks, the City of Chicago proposed a TDR plan that is discussed in
more detail below."'
2. The Chicago Plan
The Chicago plan, although never adopted,"' is another TDR scheme that
illustrates traditional TDR uses. The proposed Chicago plan differed from New
York's plan in two important respects. 2 First, the transferee district in the proposed
plan covered most of Chicago's central business district"3 and the development
holding is that determination of an individual's investment-backed expectation is from the time of purchase rather
than from the time the regulation takes effect. Id
107. See id. at 134-35 (noting that historical landmark preservation does affect general welfare and that
landowners must accept the burden for the benefit of the greater good). Landowners sacrificing for the greater good
is an old tenet of takings law. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). In Mugler, the Court upheld a law as to a
takings claim, prohibiting a liquor business from forming because individual ownership rights must yield to the
greater public good especially when the use is perceived as a public evil. Id. at 663-64.
108. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 137 (dictum) (positing that TDRs could have been relevant in determining
whether a taking had occurred). However, the Court saw no need to reach the issue given that the facts did not
support a takings claim without the TDRs being present. Id. Moreover, the Court noted that there were eight parcels
in the vicinity suitable for such a transfer. Id
109. See infra Part IV (discussing the constitutional future of TDRs and the role they should play in a court's
"takings" and "just compensation" analyses).
110. See, e.g., John J. Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of Urban
Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574, 578 n.18 (1974) (explaining the proposed Chicago plan which hoped to
implement a TDR scheme to further its goal of historical landmark preservation); see also infra Part III.B.2
(outlining briefly the Chicago plan).
111. See Stinson, supra note 10, at 204 (finding support for the theory that Chicago is a developer's town
and that the developers opposed the plan); see also American Society of Planning Officials, Transferable
Development Rights: Critique of the Chicago Plan, 304 PLANNING ADVISORY SERVICE REPORT 9 (1975)
(explaining that Chicago is a developer's town which sharply opposed the plan, and ultimately led to the plan's
downfall).
112. See Costonis, supra note 110, at 589-602 (providing an in-depth discussion of the proposed Chicago
plan); Stinson, supra note 10, at 204 (noting the two differences between the Chicago and New York plans).
113. See Costonis, supra note 110, at 594-96 (reporting that the transferee district in the Chicago plan
spanned most of the central business district in order to avoid the adjacency requirement found in the New York
plan). Professor Costonis views the adjacency requirement as the "principle culprit" in the New York plan's failure.
Id. at 594.
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rights were capable of being transferred anywhere within that district."t 4 This
difference would have made Chicago TDRs more marketable than New York TDRs
because the TDR holder in New York was relegated to transferring to adjacent or
nearby properties, thus limiting the pool of potential bidders." 5 The more willing
buyers for a product, the higher price the seller will eventually receive. In essence,
the Chicago plan would have allowed for a much more marketable TDR because
its expanded area would have produced more willing buyers, thus driving up the
price that the TDR holder would receive.
The Chicago plan's second difference is that it intended to institute a
"development rights bank.""' 6 The development rights bank is yet another means
to increase the marketability of the TDR. By acting as a transfer medium," 7 the
bank allows for a minimum price guarantee for the value of the TDR." 8
Specifically, the bank poses as a willing buyer; thus guaranteeing a TDR holder the
ability to sell that interest.1 9 The owner of the TDR, knowing that a guaranteed
price awaits, has the choice of settling for the bank's price or marketing the TDR
for the best possible value.
20
The New York and Chicago plans are excellent examples of TDR schemes that
demonstrate how each may be adjusted to fit the circumstances surrounding its
implementation. As TDRs gained acceptance, their use expanded outside the scope
of historical landmark preservation.'2' As this expansion continues, the TDR
schemes must be continuously scrutinized in order to ensure that the original goals
established are furthered.12
114. Id at 594.
115. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (positing that the marketability of TDRs increases when
the receiving area is larger given the increased pool of potential bidders).
116. See JOHNJ. COSTONIS, SPAcE ADPIPr: LANDMARK PRESERVATION AND THE MARKETPLACE 52 (1974)
(detailing the intricacies of the development rights bank in the context of the proposed Chicago plan).
117. See id. (classifying the development rights bank as a medium for transfer).
118. See id. (recognizing that the bank allows for a minimum price guarantee for the seller of the TDR by
insuring that at least one willing buyer, the bank, would purchase the development rights).
119. Id.
120. An argument can be made that the development rights bank may actually decrease competition for the
TDRs. Willing buyers of TDRs may wait patiently for these banks to accumulate TDRs from "lazy" sellers at a
lower price. If this were the case and the demand became "selective," the marketability aspect of a successful TDR
scheme may well be defeated. However, there is no empirical data on this proposition, and in reality, most people
try to sell their property whether real or personal for the best profit they can get.
121. See RODDEWIG & INGHRAM, supra note 73, at 1-3 (noting that ecological concerns gave rise to TDR
programs in such areas as the New Jersey Pinelands, Collier County, Florida, and Santa Monica, California).
122. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (articulating the goals sought to be established through
the use of TDRs as a regulatory tool).
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C. Contemporary Uses
One consistent theme that resonated through much of the preceding section was
that of preservation.'2 The focus was primarily on preservation of historical
buildings. TDR schemes are now being implemented for a different type of
preservation, namely preservation of the environment." As environmental
awareness grew, so did the need to preserve open space and environmentally
sensitive areas."z With the growing acceptance of TDR schemes in the metropolitan
areas, land use planners saw an opportunity to extend this regulatory mechanism to
an area where preservation was duly needed.'2
1. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency's Plan
The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) is responsible for regulating
property development in the Lake Tahoe Region. 27 Under TRPA's current regional
plan, 128 the agency determines the density of land development it permits on all
unbuilt residential lots in the region. 29 Any policy declaration of "maintenance of
the social and economic health of the region depends on maintaining the significant
scenic, recreational, educational, scientific, natural and public health values
provided by the Lake Tahoe Basin"' 3 is forwarded by TRPA in order to
demonstrate the need for regulating land use in the area.
Given the increased concerns about environmental preservation, TRPA's
regulation of construction density in the Lake Tahoe Basin is probably within its
police power under the "rational basis" test espoused by the Supreme Court in
123. See supra Part III.A (noting that the original purpose for TDR schemes in metropolitan areas was for
landmark preservation and growth control).
124. See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the TDR scheme employed by the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
as an attempt to preserve the environment in the Lake Tahoe region).
125. See infra Part HI.C.l (highlighting TRPA's TDR program in order to demonstrate this growing
awareness).
126. See generally Linda A. Malone, The Future of Transferable Development Rights in the Supreme Court,
73 KY. LJ. 759, 760 (1985) (explaining that there is a growing popularity of using TDRs in open space and
farmland preservation).
127. TRPA was formed in 1969 by an interstate compact between California and Nevada which was ratified
by Congress in the 1969 Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, Pub. L. No. 91-148,83 Stat. 360 (1969), and amended
in 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-51, 94 Stat. 3233 (1980); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66801 (West Supp. 1998); NEVADA REV.
STAT. § 277.200 (1997). See California v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 766 F.2d 1308, 1310-12 (9th Cir. 1985)
(detailing TRPA's background).
128. CAL GOV'T CODE § 66801 (West Supp. 1998). See Brief for Petitioner at 2, Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l
Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659 (1997) (No. 96-243) available in 1996 WL 695505 (outlining TRPA's
comprehensive plan).
129. SeePetitioner's Briefat2, Suitum (No.96-243) (noting TRPA's regulatory powers to determine building
density in the Lake Tahoe Basin).
130. CAL GOV'T CODE § 66801 (West Supp. 1998).
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Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co.3' After Village of Euclid, states are allowed
to zone/regulate pursuant to their police power.32 This police power must be
asserted for the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.'33 The standard of
whether an ordinance is within the police power is that it must not be clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the general welfare.l4
Previous case law involving TRPA and its several plans demonstrates that
TRPA is acting within its police power under the current regulatory scheme.' 35
However, the court analyzing this regulation must only give deferential treatment
to the regulation's enactment, and as our takings jurisprudence demonstrates, courts
are becoming more and more willing to find that facially valid police powers have
effected a taking on an individual's property rights.
13
Cognizant of the potential for regulatory takings claims, TRPA created the
following "marketable credit" scheme to lessen the impact on those who are
burdened by the regulation. TRPA, as a part of its regulatory plan, implemented a
scale called the Individual Parcel Evaluation System (IPES). 137 This scale
establishes thresholds for impervious land cover using a seven-point system." 8 An
IPES rating of class-seven signifies land most suitable for development, whereas
a rating of zero represents land that should not be developed. 139 Land that falls
within a Stream Environment Zone (SEZ)"4° is given an automatic IPES rating of
zero,14 ' such that individuals with land falling within a SEZ can make no
131. See Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (holding that the Village's zoning
regulations separating multi-family residential from single-family residential uses were not "clearly arbitrary and




135. See California v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 766 F.2d 1308, 1316 (9th Cir. 1985), amending 755
F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that TRPA's plan was a valid exercise of its police power).
136. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1989) (espousing the pro-landowner
categorical takings test which finds a taking if the landowner has been deprived of all economically beneficial or
productive use of his land); see also Levine, supra note 8, at 1188-92 (noting the Court's newly found concern for
private landowners rights in the law of takings).
137. TRPA CODE OF ORDINANCES § 37 (1987); see also Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 766 F.2d at 1315
(explaining TRPA's parcel evaluation system).
138. See TRPA CODE OF ORDINANCES § 37 (1987) (containing a seven-point scale for classifying whether
a parcel is suitable for development in conjunction with TRPA's overall preservation scheme for the Lake Tahoe
Basin); see also Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 766 F.2d at 1315 (reviewing TRPA's seven-point scale).
139. See TRPA CODE OF ORDINANCES § 37 (1987) (detailing in complex language the seven-point scale
employed by TRPA in determining the suitability of individual parcels for development); see also Tahoe Reg'l
Planning Agency, 766 F.2d at 1315 (highlighting TRPA's seven-point scale in a succinct manner).
140. TRPA defines a Stream Environment Zone as "an area which owes its biological physical characteristics
to the presence of surface or ground water." TRPA CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2.2 (1987).
141. TRPA CODE OF ORDINANCES § 37.4(A)(3) (1987); see Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'] Planning Agency, 117 S.
Ct. 1659, 1662 (1997) ("[A]n undeveloped parcel in certain areas carrying run-off into the watershed (known as
'Stream Environment Zones' (SEZs)) receives an IPES score of zero .... "); Petitioner's Brief at 3, Suitum (No. 96-
243) ("Under the TRPA Code and the 1987 Plan, all construction is forbidden on properties with a zero IPES rating
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improvements to their parcel. As a result, even inconsequential permanent
improvements to the land are violative of the statute. Thus, placing a fire-pit on the
land is a violation of TRPA's zoning statute because such action would constitute
a permanent improvement of the parcel.' 42
In an effort to mitigate the losses suffered by burdened landowners, TRPA
established a scheme which it calls "marketable credits." 43 Under this scheme,
property owners are required to possess certain administrative credits in order to
build on their property. 44 The three administrative credits "are designated
'residential allocations,' 'residential development rights,' and 'land coverage.' 1 45
Although a landowner with an IPES below the threshold is prevented from building
on the lot, she may market these administrative credits (essentially TDRs) to other
owners of parcels with IPES ratings above the cutoff level.1" In order to determine
if these credits are in fact marketable, a brief description of each is in order.
Residential allocations are distributed by TRPA "as a means of limiting the
number of residences built in the region each year."'147 This number is set at three
hundred. 48 Moreover, these residential allocations must be obtained through the
county in which the undeveloped lot sits. 149 The scheme holds a certain number of
these allocations for owners of parcels that were given an IPES rating below the
cutoff,50 so that they may sell this development right to owners of lots otherwise
approved for building in the basin.15 '
142. One might query whether TRPA would prevent such a small infraction; however, the import of this
hypothetical is to demonstrate that, minus TDRs, a SEZ landowner has been deprived of all economically beneficial
use of the parcel in light of Lucas. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019. This becomes significant when undertaking the
regulatory takings analysis in conjunction with TDRs. See infra Part IV.A.2 (noting the complexity that arises due
to questionable valuation when TDRs are placed in the per se takings analysis).
143. See Petitioner's Brief at 4, Suitum (No. 96-243) (stating that the "process is generically-albeit
misleadingly-described as a 'transfer of development").
144. See TRPA CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 20, 21, 33 (1987) (providing that three administrative credits must
be obtained in order for a landowner to develop his or her land in the Lake Tahoe Basin).
145. Petitioner's Brief at 4, Suitum (No. 96-243); see TRPA CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 20, 21, 33 (1987)
(defining the three marketable credits required for development in the Lake Tahoe Basin).
146. See TRPACODEOFORDINANCES §§ 20.3(B), 20.3(C), 34.1-3 (1987) (giving an administrative remedy
to a landowner who has been burdened by the regulation promulgated by the Agency via TDRs); see also
Petitioner's Brief at 4-5, Suitum (No. 96-243) (acknowledging that procedures have been created by TRPA through
which the administrative credits can be distributed to owners of burdened parcels, who, in turn, may sell them to
owners of "development-eligible lots").
147. Petitioner's Brief at 5, Suitum (No. 96-243).
148. TRPA CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33.2(A)(3) (1987); Petitioner's Brief at 5, Suitum (No. 96-243).
149. TRPA CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33.2(B)(2) (1987); Petitioner's Brief at 5, Suitum (No. 96-243).
150. See Petitioner's Brief at 5, Suitum (No. 96-243) (stating that 6 of the 60 residential allocations for
Washoe County are to be held for owners of parcels that are deemed ineligible for development under the IPES).
151. See id. (noting, however, that in order to obtain one of these "scarce credits" the burdened landowner
must enter alottery). But see Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 n.2 (1997) (observing
that counsel for the agency argued that there were fewer applicants than allocations in Mrs. Suitum's county at that
time). TRPA's counsel therefore argued that Mrs. Suitum had a 100% guarantee of obtaining that marketable credit.
Id.
A hypothetical to explain the marketable credits might prove helpful at this point. Suppose that landowner
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Residential Development Rights (RDRs) are the second marketable credit
created by TRPA. The function of RDRs differs from that of residential allocations.
RDRs limit the total amount of residential development ultimately allowed in the
Lake Tahoe Region. 152 An owner of a vacant lot in the Lake Tahoe Basin is
automatically granted one RDR by TRPA. 153 However, owners of property located
in SEZs are granted three bonus RDRs.' "' In essence, these three RDRs can be sold
to property owners who plan to develop multi-unit projects because such projects
by their nature require more residential development rights.,55
The third marketable credit under the TRPA scheme is entitled Land
Coverage. 56 The purpose of this credit is to limit the coverage that occurs on
individual lots and to cap the region's total land coverage. 57 TRPA assigns a base
coverage to each lot determined by its IPES rating. 5 8 Moreover, the base credit
assigned to lots classified within a SEZ equals one percent of the parcel size. t5 9 For
example, a landowner whose lot is 183,000 square feet has a Land Coverage credit
of 183 square feet (1% of 183,000 square feet). In the event that this landowner
finds a willing purchaser, subject to the approval of TRPA,' 6° he or she may sell this
183 square feet to a designated receiving parcel.
A has a parcel with an IPES rating of zero. Landowner B has a parcel with an IPES rating of seven (the most
suitable for building) but did not obtain one of the 300 residential allocations granted this year. Without this
allocation, landowner B may not build on his land. Although landowner A has land which may not be developed,
she does have a residential allocation credit which she may sell to B for a profit. Upon approval by TRPA,
landowner A may transfer those development rights to landowner B.
152. See Petitioner's Brief at 5-6, Suitum (No. 96-243) (explicating that possession of one RDR authorizes
the landowner to build one residential unit assuming that the owner possesses the other two required credits).
153. See id. (noting that the development ofa multi-unit building would require "aggregation of RDRs from
the owners of other properties").
154. TRPA CODE OF ORDINANCES § 35.2(C)-(D) (1987); Petitioner's Brief at 6, Suitum (No. 96-243). The
rationale for granting regulated owners three credits rather than one is to give monetary value to land that is unable
to be developed.
155. Petitioner's Brief at 6-7, Suitum (No. 96-243). It should be noted that the sale of a marketable credit is
subject to the approval of TRPA and existence of a precondition. TRPA CODE OF ORDINANCES § 34.2 (1987). In
order to sell any of TRPA's marketable credits, the burdened landowner must permanently remove the development
rights from the parcel by recording a deed restriction, or other covenants running with the land. Id. § 34.5; see also
Petitioner's Brief at 7, Suitun (No. 96-243) (noting that in order for Mrs. Suitumn to market her credits, she must
deed away the right to develop her property or place a real covenant running with the land prohibiting such
development).
156. TRPA CODE OF ORDINANCES § 20.3(A)-(C) (1987). See Petitioner's Brief at 7, Suitum (No. 96-243)
(explicating the third and final marketable credit made available by TRPA).
157. See TRPA CODE OF ORDINANCES § 20.0 (West 1987) (delineating the land coverage allocable for each
parcel to maintain a suitable land cover in the Lake Tahoe Basin); see also Petitioner's Brief at 7, Suitwn (No. 96-
243) (discussing the rationale behind the land cover credit under TRPA's land-use scheme).
158. See TRPACODE OFORDNANCES § 20.3(A)(4) (1987) (determining the amount of land cover allocable
to an individual parcel by considering the parcel size and the IPES rating it received).
159. See id. § 20.3(A) (mandating that parcels with IPES ratings of zero are assigned a base credit of 1% of
the parcel size which may be sold to landowners with land capable of development and who wish to develop beyond
the threshold established by TRPA).
160. See supra note 155 (noting the administrative hurdles a landowner must endure in order to realize any
benefit from the marketable credit scheme established by TRPA).
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2. Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
a. Facts
In 1972, Mr. and Mrs. Suitum purchased a residential lot in a planned
subdivision of Incline Village, Nevada. 61 They planned to build their retirement
home there, 62 but this plan was delayed by a series of financial setbacks and the
death of Mr. Suitum.' 63 In 1989, Mrs. Suitum decided to proceed with the plan to
build her retirement home only to find that her lot had been restricted by regulations
implemented by TRPA.' The regulation classified her land as a SEZ and thus
precluded any improvements from being made.'65 The logical result was that she
was now unable to build her retirement home on the parcel purchased in 1972.
b. Procedural History
As a response to TRPA's regulations, Mrs. Suitum filed suit alleging that the
agency had committed an unconstitutional regulatory taking by determining her lot
ineligible for development.166 The district court granted summary judgment,
reasoning that Mrs. Suitum' s claim was not ripe because no final decision was made
as to the use of Mrs. Suitum's property. 67 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed and followed the lower court's rationale that the claim was not ripe
for lack of a final decision by TRPA as to the use of Mrs. Suitum's land.
68
161. See Petitioner's Brief at 2, Suitum (No. 96-243) (discussing the factual background of Suitum).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2-3; see supra Part II1.C.I (describing TRPA's regulatory scheme in conjunction with the
marketable credits it offers to landowners burdened by the regulation).
165. See Petitioner's Brief at 3. Suitum (No. 96-243) (explaining:
In 1989, Mrs. Suitum submitted to TRPA plans to build a home on her subdivision lot. TRPA responded
by classifying Mrs. Suitum's property as lying within a "Stream Environment Zone" (SEZ) .... The
significance of TRPA's classifying Mrs. Suitum's lot as part of a Stream Environment Zone is that "no
new land coverage or other permanent land disturbance shall be permitted" on Mrs. Suitum's land.)
(citation omitted);
see also TRPA CODEOF ORDINANCES § 20.4 (1987) (providing generally that land classified as falling within a SEZ
may not be developed or improved).
166. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. CL 1659,1663 (1997) (observing that Mrs. Suitum
filed a § 1983 action in federal district court).
167. See id. at 1664 (noting that the district court held that the claim was not ripe because, in the words of
the lower court, "[a]s things now stand, there is no final decision as to how [Suitum] will be allowed to use her
property").
168. See id. (quoting the similar rationale employed by the Ninth Circuit that
"[wlithout an application for the transfer of development rights" there would be no way to "know the
regulations' full economic impact or the degree of their interference with [Suitum's] reasonable
investment-backed expectations[,]" and without action on a transfer application there would be no "final
decision from [the agency] regarding the application of the regulation[s] to the property at issue")
(quoting Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 80 F.3d 359. 362-63 (9th Cir. 1996)).
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Although TRPA's TDR scheme presented an interesting takings issue,69 the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine solely whether Mrs. Suitum's
regulatory takings claim was ripe for judicial review. 70 The majority held that the
takings claim was ripe, vacated the court of appeals' judgment and remanded for
further proceedings."' The Court's rationale in finding the claim ripe is significant
given that TDRs are becoming nore prevalent as regulatory tools. 2
c. Ripeness
In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank,173 the
United States Supreme Court held that two independent prudential limits must be
met in order to bring an action against a state in federal court on the issue of
regulatory takings.1 74 This two-prong test first requires the plaintiff to demonstrate
that a final decision has been made by the regulating entity. 75 Secondly, although
compensation was irrelevant in Suitum, 176 the plaintiff must seek compensation
through state procedures if available.
7 7
In Suitum, the Court reasoned that the petitioner's claim was ripe because the
"demand for finality [was] satisfied." 7 The Court further articulated this reasoning
by stating that "it is undisputed that the agency 'has finally determined that
petitioner's land lies entirely within a SEZ."' . 9 This determination by TRPA
precluded the petitioner from building on her land and constituted a final decision
for ripeness considerations."0 The first prong of the Williamson test "follows from
169. See infra Part IV (discussing the constitutional role that TDRs should play in the field of regulatory
takings); see also Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1671-72 (Scalia, J., concurring) (raising the issue of where TDRs fit in the
takings puzzle in his concurring opinion).
170. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1664 (specifying that the only issue that had been presented for review was
that of the ripeness of Mrs. Suitum's claim, evidently in response to Justice Scalia's concurrence that had flavors
of reaching the merits of the takings claim in conjunction with TRPA's TDR scheme).
171. Id. at 1670.
172. See infra notes 173-82 and accompanying text (discussing doctrine of ripeness as pertaining to TDRs).
173. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
174. Id. at 186; see id. at 200 (holding that the rejection of the developer's plan by a local planning
commission did not satisfy the finality requirement for ripeness); see also id. at 193 (noting that the developer must
"resort to the procedure for obtaining variances ... [and obtain] a conclusive determination by the Commission
whether it would allow" the proposed development).
175. Id.
176. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1665 n.8 (acknowledging that a plaintiff ordinarily "must seek compensation
through state inverse condemnation proceedings before initiating a taking suit in federal court, unless the State does
not provide adequate remedies for obtaining compensation"). Here, Mrs. Suitum's counsel argued, without dispute
from the Respondent, that the state did not have provisions for paying just compensation. As such, the Court
focused on the first prong of the Williamson test. Id.
177. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194.
178. Suitum, 117 S. CL at 1667.
179. id. (quoting Respondent's Brief at 21, Suitum (No. 96-243)).
180. See id. (determining that by classifying Mrs. Suitum's land as a SEZ, the Agency's action constituted
a final decision for the purposes of the doctrine of ripeness).
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the principle that only a regulation that 'goes too far' results in a taking under the
Fifth Amendment."'181 Essentially, by determining that petitioner's land lies within
a SEZ, thus precluding her from building, the agency has given a court sufficient
evidence to determine if the regulation has gone too far.
Further, the Court distinguished Suitum from Williamson by holding that an
application to sell TDRs was not "the type of 'final decision' required" by
Williamson and its progeny. 82 This is an important distinction given that many
regulatory takings claims are never heard because they are stricken on ripeness
grounds.'83 Requiring a party to apply to sell his or her TDRs in order for their
regulatory takings claim to ripen is counterintuitive because in many instances the
party seeking just compensation feels that the TDR scheme is a sham.'
In light of this holding, the stage has been set for a court to determine what role
TDRs should play in a Fifth Amendment takings analysis. Mrs. Suitum's case may
answer that very question on remand. Given that no court has definitively settled
this issue, 8 ' the following section of this Comment focuses primarily on where
TDRs fall within a Fifth Amendment takings analysis. 86 Specifically, should TDRs
be considered solely in determining whether just compensation has been paid in the
event of a taking? Or should TDRs be viewed in the aggregate as substantial value,
if they in fact do have substantial value, for purposes of determining whether a
taking has occurred? A decision either way will have important repercussions on
modem takings law. To illustrate TDRs' impact on the takings analysis, this
Comment reviews Mrs. Suitum's takings claim with and without its application.
181. Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1665 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922)).
182. See id. at 1667 (arguing that " t]hose precedents addressed the virtual impossibility of determining what
development will be permitted on a particular lot of land when its use is subject to the decision of a regulatory body
invested with great discretion, which it has not yet even been asked to exercise").
183. R.S. Raddiford, Speech at the McGeorge School of Law Federalist Society Meeting (Oct. 14, 1997)
(notes on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing his recent victory in arguing successfully before the
Supreme Court on Mrs. Suitum's ripeness claim in Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency).
184. See supra note 155 (noting that TRPA's plan requires the individual selling the TDR to deed away the
development rights). Consequently, requiring the individual to follow this action in order for the claim to be ripe
leaves nothing to be litigated concerning the takings issue because the owner no longer has the development
potential. Petitioner's Brief at 27-28, Suitun (96-243).
185. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (observing that the Supreme Court has not directly dealt with
the issue of where TDRs fall within the Fifth Amendment takings analysis). But see City of Hollywood v.
Hollywood, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1332, 1338 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (considering the presence of TDRs as to the
economic impact of the regulation in finding that a taking had not occurred).
186. See infra Part IV (identifying the often avoided question of where TDRs should fall in the Fifth
Amendment analysis and offering the solution that TDRs should be viewed merely as compensation due to their
inherent compensatory nature).
1998/Role of TDRs in Takings Analysis
d. Possible Takings Analysis in Suitum Absent TDRs
Absent TDRs,18 7 the regulation of Mrs. Suitum's land is a categorical taking. '
The facts in Suitum are strikingly similar to Lucas."8 9 In 1972, Mrs. Suitum
purchased the land-subject to no regulations-with the intent of building a
retirement home.19° TRPA denied her the right to build her home by classifying her
land as falling within a SEZ.29g This denial, absent TDRs, renders her property
economically idle, thus denying her all economically beneficial use of the land.
9 2
In effect, Mrs. Suitum's land is stripped of all value because she may neither build
on it, or sell it for a reasonable economic value given that imposing the regulation
most probably decreases the land's fair market value.
Skeptics of the categorical takings analysis will argue that Mrs. Suitum is not
deprived of all economically beneficial or productive use of her land. 193 For
example, she may place a tent on the lot or have friends over for a barbeque.
194
However, the Supreme Court could not have intended such an interpretation
because that same argument would have applied in Lucas. 95 Because the Supreme
Court found a taking in Lucas on the basis of a categorical taking, it should follow
that Mrs. Suitum's analogous situation be deemed a taking as well.
Does the presence of TDRs in Suitum make her case distinguishable from
Lucas? In Lucas there is no mention of TDRs,' however, in Suitum they are a
187. The expert witness for TRPA appraised Mrs. Suitum's marketable credit package at $30,000 to $35,000.
Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (1997). However, at the trial level, Mrs. Suitum
argued that the scheme was a sham and offered an affidavit from one of TRPA's former employees that stated, in
pertinent part, that "there is little to no value to [Suitum's TDRs] at the present time as... either [there is] no
market for them or the procedure for transferring one particular right would restrict the opportunity to transfer a
remaining right." Id. (alteration in original).
188. See infra Part m.C.2.d (arguing that TRPA's scheme had deprived Mrs. Suitum of all economically
beneficial or productive use of her land).
189. See Petitioner's Brief at 30-31, Suitum (96-243) (arguing that the eery similarity between the two cases
supports the contention that Mrs. Suitum's claim is a categorical taking requiring payment ofjust compensation).
190. See id at 2-4 (noting that when Mrs. Suitum and her husband bought the parcel, at that time unregulated,
they had expectations of building their retirement home).
191. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (declaring that Mrs. Suitum's land falls within a SEZ and
as a result must be given an IPES rating of zero).
192. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text (discussing Lucas' categorical taking analysis).
193. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (holding that a regulation
depriving a landowner of all economically beneficial or productive use of his land by completely preventing the
development of his beach-front homes effects a categorical taking).
194. See id. at 1064 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (noting that the all or nothing approach espoused by the majority
creates inequitable results between individuals who retain 5% of the value of their land while others enjoy full
constitutional protection if their land is deemed to be deprived of all economically viable use).
195. Id. at 1064-65.
196. See generally Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (expounding a categorical takings analysis without
considering the effects that regulatory tools such as TDRs and exactions may have on the analysis).
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crucial part of TRPA's regulatory scheme.t97 Because Mrs. Suitum has the potential
for economic benefit on a successful sale of the TDRs-although what amount she
receives is questionable t'--should she be prevented from a categorical takings
analysis? t99 By allowing TDRs into the Fifth Amendment takings analysis, the
logical answer is yes. She is no longer being denied all economically beneficial or
productive use of her land, thus failing to meet the Lucas test.200 However, the
pressing question is whether allowing TDRs in the Fifth Amendment takings
analysis is logical in the first place. Lastly, assuming such analysis is logical, what
role should TDRs play in the ad hoc Penn Central test? The final Part of this
Comment considers these questions and posits a simple solution. TDRs do have a
place in the Fifth Amendment analysis, however their role is merely that of just
compensation.
IV. THE ROLE OF TDRs IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL TAKINGS ANALYSIS
Justice Scalia states the proper approach in his concurrence in Suitum as to
where TDRs fit in the Fifth Amendment puzzle.201 Justice Scalia explains that TDRs
can "serve a commendable purpose."'2° However, this purpose is limited to
mitigating financial loss suffered by regulated landowners, and in fully
compensating a landowner for such a loss. 20 3 Scalia posits that TDRs' relevance in
a Fifth Amendment analysis concerns only that of just compensation. If TDRs are
used in determining whether a taking has occurred, then serious abuses of the
system could arise.0 5
For instance, implementation of sham schemes to avoid regulatory takings
litigation is one possible abuse. 0 6 Policy dictates that TDR schemes be valid and
197. See generally TRPA CODE OF ORINNANCES (1987) (establishing the regulatory scheme that has
prevented Mrs. Suitum from building her retirement home); Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct.
1659, 1662-63 (1997) (outlining TRPA's regulatory scheme); supra Part IUT.C.I (discussing TRPA's regulatory
scheme and the marketable credits available to regulated landowners).
198. Both parties to the litigation have differing estimations as to the amount the TDRs in question will
demand. See supra note 187 (demonstrating the differing views of valuing TDRs).
199. See infra Part IV (arguing that the presence of TDRs should not effect the Lucas categorical takings
analysis and should be relegated to the role of just compensation for simplicity and equity).
200. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text (outlining the Lucas test).
201. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1670-73 (Scalia, J., concurring) (opining that the TDRs role in the Fifth
Amendment analysis is merely that ofjust compensation because the TDR compensates and is not a part of the land
being regulated).
202. Id. at 1672 (Scalia, J., concurring).
203. Id.
204. See id. (reasoning that using TDRs in the takings analysis "will render much of our regulatory takings
jurisprudence a nullity").
205. See infra notes 222-27 and accompanying text (discussing the windfalls that regulators will receive, as
well as the potential for abuse, by including TDRs on the taking side of the analysis).
206. See Levine, supra note 8, at 1212 (noting that implementing TDR plans is an effective way to avoid
litigation because the TDR can be viewed as substantial value, and, as such, the courts would be required to decide
the claim under the more deferential balancing of interests standard rather than the pro-property owner Lucas test).
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for the benefit of the restricted landowner. In the instance of a sham scheme the
only party benefitted is the regulator. Moreover, the existence of a sham scheme
tends to negate the public confidence necessary for successful implementation of
TDRs.207 Justice Scalia views placing TDRs on the takings side of the analysis as
an artifice that "seeks to take advantage of... our m akings [C]lause
jurisprdence. ' 8'
The crux of Scalia's analysis adheres to the concept that TDRs have no relation
in the use or development of land to which they are attached by the specific
regulation.2" Hence, the value attributable to TDRs comes in exchange for a taking
and not in its place.2 0 According to Scalia, TDRs are nothing more than
compensation.21 ' Furthermore, the fact that payment comes from a third party in
TRPA's TDR scheme has no bearing on whether the payment is viewed as
compensation.2 2 This is sensible given that some TDR schemes involve transfers
to third parties while others allow for transfers to lots owned by the burdened
party;2 3 drawing a distinction between the two would result in disparate treatment
in otherwise similar situations.21 4
In order to follow this analysis, the Court must deal with the dicta posited in
Penn Central.2 5 Although it was not necessary to deal with the TDR issue as it
applied to the owners of the historical landmark, the Court stated TDRs had value
to mitigate the financial burdens wrought by regulations and that they "are to be
207. See supra note 91 and accompanying text (discussing the need for public confidence in a TDR scheme
in order for it to be successful).
208. Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1671 (Scalia, J., concurring); see id. (alluding to a TDR as a "clever, albeit
transparent device" for the avoidance of a takings claim).
209. See id. (recognizing the distinction between the right to use and develop one's own land and the right
to confer on another "an increased power to use and develop his land").
210. See id. (reasoning, "fi]n essence, the TDR permits the landowner whose right to use and develop his
property has been restricted or extinguished to extract money from others").
211. See id. (noting that a cash payment from the government would not be considered when determining
whether a regulation has gone too far, rather it would only be used to determine whether just compensation had
been paid).
212. See id. at 1672 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasizing that the payment coming from a third party "looks
too much like compensation").
213. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (illustrating that TDR schemes vary in form from transfers
to third parties as well as transfers to nearby or adjacent property owned by the burdened landowner).
214. For instance, suppose regulation A involved a TDR scheme that only allowed transfers to parcels owned
by the regulated party, while regulation B allows for the transfer of development rights to approved third parties.
The benefit conferred upon the regulated owner in A comes directly from the regulatory body, thus resembling
compensation. While under B, the benefit conferred upon the burdened landowner (i.e., essentially money from the
TDR exchange) comes from a third party resembling value for property sold. The distinction between these two
regulations is illusory at best. In both scenarios the landowner is given a TDR with different administrative hurdles,
but, more importantly, with the same goal of mitigating the adverse effects of the regulation. Furthermore,
differential treatment simply creates a loophole resulting in TDR schemes intentionally created to run to third
parties to avoid inverse condemnation claims.
215. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,137 (1978) (dictum) (noting in a paragraph
of dicta that TDRs could be taken into account when determining the "impact of the regulation").
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taken into account in considering the impact of the regulation. 21 6 Was this dictum
thoroughly considered at the time of this opinion? If so, should it be narrowly
applied on the facts of Penn Central? If not, given that the Court stated that TDRs
are relevant to the regulatory impact,217 does that mean that their relevance is
limited to the ad hoc Penn Central test, thus precluding consideration of TDRs in
the Lucas context?
A. Lucas Has No "Category" for TDRs
Allowing TDRs in a Lucas categorical takings analysis will render Lucas
obsolete.28 Although many commentators would not be concerned with this
outcome,21 9 they fail to recognize the underlying rationale of the Lucas decision.2
The underpinning of Lucas is that regulatory schemes seeking to keep land in its
natural state place such a burden on the landowner that even the most compelling
state interest will not suffice absent just compensation.221 Inverse condemnation
claims based on the reasoning in Lucas will become obsolete if we allow TDRs into
the "takings" side of the analysis.2 2 This will result because every regulatory
scheme concerned with approaching the level of a taking will contain a provision
allocating TDRs to the burdened landowners, thus circumventing Lucas "
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See infra notes 222-23 and accompanying text (asserting that land use regulators will be inclined to
circumvent Lucas by implementing TDR schemes in order to create the appearance that the land has retained some
economically beneficial value). If this type of circumvention is allowed, it will only be a matter of time before all
regulations approaching a categorically taking find TDR schemes attached.
219. See, e.g., Robert Brauneis, "The Founding of Our 'Regulatory Takings' Jurisprudence": The Myth and
Meaning of Justice Holmes's Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE LJ. 613, 693 (1996)
(explicating that the Court in Lucas misses the complexity of Mahon and "leaves Justice Holmes's opinion
representing little more than the single dimension of diminution in value"); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The
Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings & Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REV. 305, 308 (1997) (noting that
commentators were split as to their predictions of Lucas' potential impact on habitat modification, and that, to date,
those predicting that there would be little effect are correct); A. Dan Tarlock, Local Government Protection of
Biodiversity: What is Its Niche?, 60 U. CH. L. REv. 555, 587 (1993) (arguing that the Court in Lucas strays from
the Framers' intent).
220. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-18 (1992) (explaining that certain
regulations place such an onerous burden on landowners that the societal interest promoted by the regulation will
not be considered as a countervailing balance).
221. See generally id. at 1015-19 (indicating that a regulation will effect a per se taking without consideration
of the public's interest when the burdened landownerbas been deprived of all economically beneficial or productive
use of his land).
222. See id. at 1017 (noting that denial of all beneficial use is tantamount to a permanent physical
occupation); see also Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659,1672 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(noting that Lucas and its progeny will become a nullity if TDRs are considered on the takings side of the analysis).
223. See Levine, supra note 8, at 1209-12 (suggesting as a strategy for environmental groups and lobby
legislatures to enact statutes that utilize TDRs to circumvent the holding of Lucas).
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Of course, some notion of de minimis value will be required by the courts.2 24
However, the value of the TDR will not have to reach the fair market value of the
land to prevent the taking.' Under this application, the government receives a
windfall because they are implementing a scheme that resembles compensation
226
while avoiding the just compensation strictures.? 7 Namely, just compensation
requires giving full and fair compensation for a taking under the Fifth
Amendment.? By satisfying the de minimis requirement, whatever level that may
be, the regulator is relieved of paying the aggrieved landowner the fair market value
of the land. This windfall bestowed upon land-use planners is a license to regulate
indiscriminately.
The Penn Central dicta concerning TDRs supports an argument against
considering TDRs in the Lucas context. The Court's limiting of TDRs' application
to the economic impact factor of the ad hoc analysis permits an inference as to
the relevance of TDRs in the categorical takings analysis. Given their exclusion
from the investment-backed expectations factor,230 it is reasonable to infer that
TDRs are not applicable to the Lucas analysis. By completely preventing a
landowner from developing his land, a regulation is wholly denying the individual's
investment-backed expectations. Since Penn Central did not place import on the
TDR's relation to the owner's investment-backed expectations," the analogy
suggests that TDRs are not applicable in the Lucas context, at least when relying
on Penn Central as the authority.
It would be presumptuous to ignore the flaw in the analysis just stated.
Categorical takings were but a sparkle in the Supreme Court's eye at the time Penn
224. Surely a court would not allow a TDR worth $100 to be considered as an economically viable use to
an owner of a parcel originally worth $30,000. However the issue becomes more difficult as the value of the TDR
rises. For instance, what if the value of the TDR was determined to be $5,000 or $15,000?
225. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 (explicating that denial of all economically beneficial use of land is a per
se taking). The logical corollary from this holding is that some economically beneficial use left in the land will
prevent a per se taking claim. Ma
226. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659, 1672 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(positing that payment from a third party looked too much like compensation).
227. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
322 (1987) (holding that fair compensation is due when a regulation effects a taking even if that taking is
temporary).
228. Id at 319 (stating: "Vhere this burden results from government action that amounted to a taking, the
Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that the government pay the landowner for the value
of the use of the land during this period:).
229. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978) (dictum) (acknowledging that
TDRs may be considered when determining the economic impact of the regulation in an ad hoc inquiry).
230. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text (discussing the factors relevant in the ad hoc takings
analysis espoused in Penn Central).
231. See generally Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 137 (positing the possible importance of TDRs in considering the
impact of the regulation while completely omitting the other two factors espoused earlier in the opinion).
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Central was decided. 2 How could the Court preclude the application of TDRs in
an area of the law not yet created? That is where the analogy of the investment-
backed expectation to the notion of economically beneficial use comes into play.
The development of land, in some fashion, is the primary reason for individuals
buying that land.23 It is rare that an individual would purchase a parcel with
expectations of letting it lie idle. After Lucas, if a regulation forces the landowner
to leave his land in its natural state, he is denied his expectation to develop, or in
other words, he "is deprived of all economically beneficial or productive use of the
land., 3
1. Exactions?: Nollan v. California Coastal Commission as a Predictive Tool
Exactions are another tool utilized by regulators to further their regulatory
schemes.2 5 An exaction is a concession required of a landowner who wishes to
change the nature or use of her land. 36 The Supreme Court's treatment of exactions
may add insight as to how TDRs will be treated if and when the issue reaches our
country's highest court.27
In 1987, the Supreme Court decided Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission.23' In Nollan, the landowners leased, with the option to purchase, a
beach front lot which maintained a haggard bungalow.239 As required by the
purchase option, the owners planned to tear this edifice down and replace it with a
three bedroom house in conformity with the surrounding neighborhood.40 In order
to build a replacement home, the Nollan's were required to obtain a "coastal
development permit" from the California Coastal Commission.24 The Coastal
Commission conditioned the granting of the permit upon the dedication of an
232. Penn Central was decided in 1978, followed by Loretto in 1982 and Lucas in 1992. Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1303 (1992); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
233. Mrs. Suitum and Mr. Lucas are just two examples of the many who partake in this investment.
234. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015; see id. (espousing the second situation in which a categorical taking will be
found).
235. See Douglas T. Kendall & James E. Ryan, "Paying" For the Change: Using Eminent Domain to Secure
Exactions and Sidestep Nollan and Dolan, 81 VA. L. REv. 1801, 1802 (1995) (noting that the purpose behind
exactions is to mitigate the harm that the development will impose on the municipality).
236. Id. Exactions come in various forms, such as impact fees, provision of services, restrictions on land use,
and dedications. Idt
237. See infra notes 238-48 and accompanying text (discussing the Courts takings analysis when confronted
with a regulatory tool such as an exaction).
238. 483 U.S. 825 (1987); see id. at 838-39 (holding that the conditioning ofa permit to build on the granting
of an easement is a taking without just compensation because the easement does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests).
239. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827 (noting the relevant facts of the case pertaining to the issue of whether the
condition placed upon the landowner constituted a taking requiring just compensation).
240. Id. at 827-28.
241. Id. at 828.
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easement for public use across the Nollan's property.242 In protest of the
Commission's actions, the Nollan's filed suit arguing that the access condition
violated the Fifth Amendment, as incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment.243
For the purpose of determining where TDRs fit in the Fifth Amendment
analysis, the Nollan Court's analytical steps prove more important than the general
holding. First, the Court determined that, absent the condition to rebuild, a taldng
had occurred. 244 Requiring a landowner to convey an easement across his or her
property to the government is a paradigmatic exercise of eminent domain.2
45
Second, the Court asked whether requiring this conveyance "as a condition for
issuing a land-use permit alters the outcome." Third, the Court required that the
exaction substantially advance legitimate state interests, which must be shown by
demonstrating a causal nexus between the exaction and the regulatory scheme.2 47
Fourth, absent the requisite nexus, the condition appears to be "an out-and-out plan
of extortion"24 by the regulator, which constitutionally requires payment of just
compensation.
This piecemeal analysis forwarded by the Nollan majority249 works when
applied to TDRs as well. The first analytical step in Nollan asks whether a taking
had occurred minus the permit condition.2 This step is critical in the TDR context
because separation of the TDR from the land being regulated will allow a court to
determine if the regulation has effected a taking. Looking back to Mrs. Suitum's
situation, the Court's takings analysis is simplified by following this segmented
approach. Essentially, a court must ask itself whether a taking has occurred while
completely disregarding the presence of any TDRs. If, in fact, a taking is effected,
then the TDRs may be marketed to supply just compensation to the burdened
242. See iUL (noting that the Coastal Commission believed that this easement "would make it easier for the
public to get to Faria County Park and the Cove").
243. Id at 829.
244. Id. at 831. The Court explains:
Had California simply required the Nollans to make an easement across their beachfront available to
the public on a permanent basis in order to increase public access to the beach, rather than conditioning




246. Id at 834.
247. See id at 837-38 (requiring that an essential nexus exist between the condition placed upon the
landowner and the regulatory scheme forwarded by the commission). The Court eventually held that this nexus was
not shown by the commission resulting in a taking of the Nollan's property for the use of a public easement. Id. at
837.
248. l d at 837.
249. See id. at 828-34 (setting forth a segmented approach when dealing with exactions in the context of a
takings claim); see also Kendall & Ryan, supra note 235, at 1809 (recounting that the Court in Nollan used four
analytical steps to reach its holding).
250. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831 (explicating that minus the permit condition, a regulation requiring the
granting of an easement for public access is doubtlessly a taking).
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owner. If the TDRs do not command an amount equal to the fair market value of the
burdened land, then the regulator must supply the missing amount.
2. Policy Considerations
Several policy considerations counsel that TDRs should be removed from the
takings analysis as well. First, TDRs can be an effective regulatory tool if they are
marketable.75' By relegating the TDRs to the compensation side of the analysis,
regulators will have a vested interest in making the schemes as marketable as
possible. 2 This interest stems from the fact that any difference between the fair
market value of the land burdened and the amount the TDR commands is paid by
the regulatory agency to fulfill the just compensation requirement. 3 Hence, if the
TDR commands an amount equal to the fair market value, then the regulator owes
nothing. This economic incentive has the potential of preventing sham schemes,
and, more importantly, producing schemes that are effective. Conversely, by
placing the TDR on the takings side of the analysis this incentive is stripped away.
In fact, regulators will be enticed to limit the TDR's value to something more than
de minimis but far from fair market value. Surely TDRs were not created with this
manipulative intent.2-4 Mitigation, not manipulation, is the underpinning of a
TDR."5 Treating TDRs as compensation will give teeth to an effective land-use
planning tool by encouraging viable schemes that mitigate the harms suffered by
burdened landowners.
Second, a TDR's value is inherently speculative. Given the relative
unpredictability of the amount a TDR will command,' 6 it must be placed on the
compensation side of the analysis for two reasons. First, Takings Clause
jurisprudence is already complex. 7 Adding the speculative-value TDR to the
251. See supra notes 83-91 and accompanying text (discussing the factors that lead to marketable TDRs).
252. See supra notes 83-91 and accompanying text (noting that regulators have the capacity to establish
marketable schemes).
253. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656-57 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (explicating in a dissent soon to be widely accepted:
When one person is asked to assume more than a fair share of the public burden, the payment of just
compensation operates to redistribute that economic cost from the individual to the public at large....
The payment of just compensation serves to place the landowner in the same position monetarily as he
would have occupied if his property had not been taken.) (citations omitted).
254. See Roberts, supra note 76, at 399 (explaining that TDRs are used to mitigate the loss of value to
individual landowners caused by regulatory programs that place sharp restrictions of the use of land).
255. See idh (arguing that "restricting an individual's ability to alter the natural characteristics ofher land may
impose significant economic loss, which can be mitigated by granting her a transferable development right"); see
also Stinson, supra note 10, at 353 (postulating that TDR programs can be undermined when property owners fear
that developers may manipulate the credits to their advantage).
256. See Kendall & Ryan, supra note 235, at 1875 (discussing the speculative value of TDRs); see also supra
note 187 (demonstrating that disagreement as to the amount the TDR will command is not uncommon).
257. See Lazarus, supra note 26. at 181 (recognizing the attempts by scholars to harness the doctrinal
incoherence of the Fifth Amendment's takings jurisprudence).
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puzzle will impugn complexity to this already complex doctrine. As in Suitum, both
parties will offer experts, with surprisingly different findings as to the value of the
TDR in question. s8 Inequities running to both parties are certain to occur when
courts are left to rely on this type of speculation.2"9 The solution to this dilemma is
consistent and simple: let the market be the final arbitrator. Once the TDR is sold,
there is no question as to the amount it commanded.m If the cash received does not
equal the fair market value of the burdened property then the regulator must pay the
difference. 61
Moreover, considerations of judicial economy are relevant. Litigation
concerning the alleged value of TDRs may very well flood the courts.262 Allowing
TDRs to be considered as value on the takings side of the analysis will encourage
abusive sham schemes.763 As a result, courts will be inundated with time consuming
litigation concerning the scheme's validity and the TDRs' value. Judicial economy
will be achieved by relegating the TDR to the compensation side of the analysis.
For instance, regulators will be encouraged to promote viable schemes which
receive fair market value, thus lessening the disputes reaching litigation.2"
Furthermore, the problem with speculative valuation will no longer exist since the
market is the ultimate evaluator.265 Consequently, courts will be relieved of the
onerous task of determining a TDR scheme's viability, thus saving judicial time and
energy.
258. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (1997) (explicating that both parties
had serious disagreement as to the value that the TDRs would command once marketed).
259. For instance, if the Court in Suitum agreed with the speculation of TRPA's expert, thus finding that the
TDRs had value, Mrs. Suitum's takings claim would be prevented. Id. Hypothetically speaking, Mrs. Suitum tries
to sell her TDRs but falls to find a willing buyer thereby making her TDRs valueless. By adopting the approach
suggested by this Comment, this inequity is avoided. The market, not a paid expert, determines the amount the
TDRs are worth and the regulator picks up the difference, if any, to satisfy the just compensation requirement of
the Fifth Amendment
260. After the sale of the TDR there is no longer room to speculate. The amount of the cash received will be
what the market was willing to pay and in turn will signify the value of the TDR. If that value does not reach the
fair market value of the burdened land then the regulator should fulfill the just compensation requirement out of
its own funds.
261. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656-57 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the individual who suffers a taking must be made monetarily whole with society shouldering
the burden).
262. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1664 (noting the disagreement as to the amount the TDRs will command when
Mrs. Suitum attempts to market them). Logic dictates that disagreements of this magnitude inevitably end up being
litigated. Id.
263. See Levine, supra note 8, at 1209-10 (encouraging lobbyists and regulators to implement TDR schemes
to circumvent categorical takings claims by aggrieved landowners).
264. See supra notes 83-91 and accompanying text (arguing that regulators have the ability to promote
marketable TDR schemes). By placing the TDR on the compensation side of the analysis the regulator would be
inclined to promote more marketable TDR schemes. The more value that the TDR commands on the market the
less the regulator is required to pay to fulfill the just compensation requirement. In sum, the regulator's (hence
society's) self interest will promote the interest of the burdened landowneras well.
265. See supra notes 259-61 and accompanying text (noting that the market is the best place to determine
the value of a TDR given the TDR's speculative nature).
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B. Is There Still a Place for TDRs in the Ad Hoc Test?
By concluding that TDRs should not be considered in the categorical analysis,
the question remains as to their application in an ad hoc test. In the twenty years
following Penn Central only one court has ventured into the TDR-takings
quagnire."6 In City of Hollywood v. Hollywood, Inc., v the Florida District Court
of Appeal added TDRs to the ad hoc test when considering the economic impact of
a regulation.2 Looking to the "economics of the exchange," the court found that
the TDRs actually benefitted the landowner being regulated.2
The problem with this court's analysis is that it blurs the line between a taking
and just compensation.2 70 The very nature of the TDR creates this result because of
its separate character from the actual development of the burdened land 7 When
a landowner is burdened by a regulation, the TDR seeks to compensate rather than
refurbish the owner's ability to develop 72
The Hollywood court found ease in applying TDRs to the taking analysis for
several reasons. First, as in Penn Central, the burdened owner owned a contiguous
parcel which directly benefitted from the transfer of development. 3 The direct
benefit softened the blow of the regulation in this instance because the landowner
owned the receiving lot.274 Second, the court characterized the TDR transaction as
266. In fact, only three courts have dealt with this issue. See, e-g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 137-38 (1978) (dictum) (expressing that TDRs may be considered as value in determining whether
a regulatory taking has occurred); City of Hollywood v. Hollywood, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. Dist. CL App.
1983) (recognizing the TDRs as value attributable to the land in holding that the landowner had not experienced
a taking); Fred F. French Investing Co., Inc. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 381, 386 (N.Y. 1976) (explaining
that the TDR scheme did not supply substantial value to prevent the landowner's takings claim).
267. 432 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1983) (holding that a regulation restricting the development of
single family units did not effectuate a taking, adding that TDRs available to the landowner lessened the economic
impact of the regulation when applying the ad hoc takings inquiy).
268. See Hollywood, 432 So. 2d at 1336-38 (holding that the presence of TDRs limited economic impact of
regulation and thus landowner's property had not been taken without just compensation).
269. See id. at 1338 (noting that the transfer involved the loss of the right to build 79 single family units in
exchange for the added right to 368 more multi-family units on adjoining land already owned by the landowner).
270. See id. at 1337 (stating that TDRs are an alternative to give the burdened landowner "fair compensation"
for land being preserved).
271. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659, 1671 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(recognizing that there is a difference between a TDR and one's own right to develop property that has been
burdened).
272. For instance, Mrs. Suitum must permanently encumber her land when she sells her TDRs, thus TRPA
fails to enhance her development rights by merely compensating her for the property being regulated. See
Petitioner's Brief at 8, Suitum (96-243) (explaining that in order for Mrs. Suitum to sell her TDRs she would have
to encumber her land by deed or other covenant running with the land).
273. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978) (noting that the owners had
the ability to transfer the development rights to eight parcels in the nearby vicinity); Hollywood, 432 So.2d at 1338
(recognizing that the owner's contiguous parcel is directly benefitted by the transfer).
274. Using Mrs. Suitum as an example, this direct benefit is rare. She is being regulated and does not own
a lot in the vicinity in order to directly benefit from the TDRs. This distinguishing factor lends to the argument that
the presence of TDRs should be seen as compensation if they indeed have value rather than preventing an otherwise
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a "quid pro quo." 275 The even-handed nature of the exchange convinced the court
of the correctness of applying TDRs to the analysis.276 However, the mere fact that
the court employed this Latin term, meaning "one for the other," suggests that
TDRs are being viewed as compensation. 2" As evidenced by Suitum, a quid pro quo
exchange in the TDR arena is the exception and not the rule. 8 The solution to this
dilemma is achieved by relegating the issue of a TDR's value to the question of
whether just compensation is paid.279 If, indeed, a quid pro quo exchange is found,
there is no takings claim because just compensation has been paid.280 In order to
promote uniformity, this proposal must be applied to both categorical and ad hoc
takings analyses.2s
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment opens with a citation recognizing the need for new ideas and
constitutional tolerance as land use develops.' As the law of zoning and regulation
modernizes, so must the takings jurisprudence effected by it. Applying TDRs to the
takings side of the Fifth Amendment's protections will prove both unworkable and
inequitable.2 3 The swinging pendulum between producti e utilization of land and
all out preservation must be allowed to stop at a point of equilibrium. Using TDRs
to determine whether a taking has occurred will unnaturally reverse this pendulum
viable taidngs claim.
275. See Hollywood. 432 So. 2d at 1338 (stating, "[Tio us, the quid pro quo is what should control.").
276. See id. at 1338 (refusing to "quarrel with the economics of the exchange" because the burdened
landowner is being greatly benefitted by the TDR scheme).
277. Webster's dictionary defines "quid pro quo" as "[ain equal exchange or substitution." WEBSTER'S I1
NEW RIVERSIDE DICTIONARY 573 (Berkeley ed. 1984). A direct translation from Latin to English is"one for the
other."
278. Questions inherent in the valuation of the TDRs in Mrs. Suitum's situation still remain. Suitum v. Tahoe
Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (1997). Uncertainty as to the TDR's value cannot ensure a quid pro
quo exchange. Nevertheless, allowing the market to determine the actual value of the TDR will initiate the move
towards a quid pro quo exchange, and any amount less than such an exchange can be supplemented by the regulator
under this proposed solution.
279. See supra Part IV.A.2 (discussing the policy rationale for relegating the TDR to the compensation side
of the takings analysis).
280. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (allowing for private property to be taken for public use so long as just
compensation is paid).
281. See supra Part IV.A.2 (arguing that abuses such as sham TDR schemes and questions as to the value
of TDR schemes in general make their application to a takings analysis both tools of circumvention and confusion).
282. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (quoting Fred F. French Investing Co., Inc. v. City of New
York, 350 N.E.2d 381, 389 (N.Y. 1976)).
283. See supra Part IV.A.2 (discussing the policy rationale, namely equity, simplicity and judicial economy,
for relegating TDRs to the just compensation side of the Fifth Amendment analysis).
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and erase much of our recent taldngs jurisprudence. 2" We cannot allow an artifice
to serve this function.28 5
284. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. CL 1659, 1672 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(expressing the fear that placing TDRs on the takings side of the Fifth Amendment analysis will render much of
the recent takings jurisprudence a nullity).
285. This is a reference to the hypothetical posed by Justice Scalia in Suitum in which regulators underaland
use scheme attach TDRs with a value of $1,000 to each lot being regulated. In theory, this could preclude a takings
analysis, however, Scalia concludes that this "looks too much like compensation:' Id.

